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Introduction 
 
Financial crises seem to constitute an indispensable part of the economic history of the last 
three decades becoming worldwide phenomena.  Both developing and developed countries 
have suffered from these “black days” in the financial markets. In the case of developed 
countries, financial crises have been costly to the economy. However the damage that was 
imposed on developing countries seems to be far greater and they became victims most of the 
time. 
 
After a while conditions dictated necessity to correct apparent inefficiency of international 
markets in handling crises situations. Thus lenders of last resort notion came to the light. First 
domestic, which was mostly central banks of the countries, then in the view of spreading 
international financial crises, international lender of last resort appeared. In the latter case 
IMF was seen to take upon responsibility of stabilizing situations in case of ‘fire alarm’. 
 
Taken in the context of international financial markets, there is an emerging argument that 
IMF-led funding packages to countries suffering from financial crises have undermined 
efforts to forestall such crises, typical example of moral hazard problem. Moral hazard occurs 
when transaction has already been carried out between parties in the financial market. The 
hazard is that borrower could have incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable from 
lender’s point of view, i.e. those activities that will make it much less likely that borrower’s 
money will be paid out. In this study, we will try to find the correlation level between IMF 
lending and moral hazard problem.  
 
In the first part, historical review of the financial crises is given and theoretical explanation is 
presented. The second part of the work is about lenders of last resort, how they fit into the 
situation of financial distress, whether benefits from bailing out debtor is higher than the 
costs, in the face of moral hazard problem. Finally, in the last part of my thesis, I will evaluate 
correlation level between severity and frequency of financial crises and the IMF lending to the 
countries.  
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Part 1 Financial crises in economic history 
  
1.1 Brief history of financial crises 
 
Financial crises seem to constitute an indispensable part of the economic history of the last 
three decades becoming a worldwide phenomenon.  Both developing and developed countries 
have suffered from these “black days” in the financial markets. In the case of developed 
countries, financial crises have been costly to the economy; however the damage that imposed 
on emerging countries seems to be far greater, becoming victims most of the time. 
 
Economic or financial crises are not the products of modern times only. Starting from 16th and 
17th centuries we can trace the tracks of financial distress and difficulties faced by different 
countries and small regions in some cases. However, the effect of globalization has made the 
most recent crises more visible and painful, as it affected the whole regions and distant 
countries from the original place, where the crisis started. For example, 1997 East Asian crisis 
was followed by a default in Russia in 1998, financial distress in Brazil and Argentina at the 
end of millennium, and finally in causing plummeting of the stock market in US in year 2002.  
 
Giving formal definition to financial crisis, according to Mishkin (1992) we can characterize 
it as a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and morel hazard problems 
become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those 
who have the most productive investment opportunities.1
 
An alternative explanation of financial crisis is given by Schwartz (1986): Financial crisis is 
where there is a threat to country’s money supply. This definition can be considered as the 
most operationally useful definition2. Because banks in fractional reserves takes deposits and 
makes loans thus multiplying the stock of money. The danger of one bank failure pushes 
depositors to run to other banks trying to take out their savings in cash, thus opening way for 
other similar failings. This in its turn increases the probability of major collapse in the stock 
of money and a severe recession in the real economy. It can be more effectively illustrated by 
                                                 
1 Frederick S. Mishkin (1992). Anatomy of financial crises. Evolutionary Economics 
2 Forrest Capie (1998). Can there be an International Lender-of-last-resort. International Finance 1:2 pp. 311-325 
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the formula of broad money supply. Broad money supply can be calculated as money base 
(money in circulation) times  money multiplier: 
 
1 C
DM BC R
D D
⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥= ∗⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 
 
M - broad money 
B – monetary base 
C
D
- the public’s currency/deposit ratio 
R
D
 - the bank’s cash reserve/deposit ratio3
 
In this case the monetary authorities control B, the monetary base, which is determined via the 
balance of payments. So, during the financial crisis period depositors withdraw their funds 
and prefer holding cash instead. As a response to this rush into banks, financial institutions 
increase their cash holdings. Both actions when summed leads to detraction of money 
multiplier. Unless authorities controlling monetary base are involved with counteraction, 
collapse in the money supply is unavoidable.  
 
Since financial crises comes about when there is a critical contraction in money supply, 
authorities handling monetary base can act as a lender of last resort, coming to the help. 
More detailed about lenders of last resort (both domestic and international) we will discuss in 
the second part of the thesis.  
 
General pattern in historically recorded financial crises can be summarized as following: it all 
starts with the economy expanding, which might have different sources of the corresponding 
expansion. As a result of this expansion the optimism among investors is surging, the rate of 
growth of credit increases and the economic growth accelerates further. Seeing this 
improvement in the economy and mentally extrapolating it into the future, individuals decide 
to invest in papers that deliver short-term gains rather than to put money into assets where 
return is associated with the productivity of underlying assets. The increase in the supply of 
                                                 
3 Forrest Capie (1998). Can there be an International Lender-of-last-resort. International Finance 1:2 pp. 311-325 
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credit and the more prospective outlook of the economy leads to economic boom. As a result 
investments surge and household spending increases as personal wealth rises. Later there 
appear concerns that particular borrowers had become over-extended. Since those individuals' 
investments concentrate on assets with short-term gain in sight, certain external event may 
lead to reassessment of such creditors' solvency. Creditors may reconsider terms of the 
extended loans by increasing interest rates charged. Increased interest charges exceed the 
benefits coming from the gains in short term assets and investors start to sell their assets at 
hand. Prices following supply-demand rule begin to decline, thus leads to reduction in the 
value of assets used as guarantees or mortgages by the banks for their loans. Soon, banks feel 
distress in recovering extended loans.  
 
This whole process resembles the growth of the soap bubble that can not be blown 
indefinitely; it should explode at one moment of time. That is why “bubble” term is used on 
many occasions as a synonym of Financial Crises. By definition it means non sustainable 
pattern of price changes or cash flows. History has shown that bubbles will always implode.  
    
History is rich in small scale stories of financial distress, troubles spread to the all four corners 
of the world. Since speed of the spreading news was quite slow before the 20th century, those 
difficulties remained mainly of a local character. With the increasing pace of technological 
improvements and inventions it became much easier to have information transmitted from one 
part of the world to the other part within seconds. Considering extensive web of 
interconnected relations among regions and separate countries any bad news in one region are 
no longer a just a local ‘headache’. 
 
We can take a historical look over the most important and painstaking financial crises, starting 
with the financial distress happened during the reign of Holy Roman Empire in the 17th 
century. They can be summarized in the following table as TOP 10 of financial crises. 
Alternatively this list can be called 10 biggest “explosions of bubbles”. 
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No  The description of historical incident  Period 
1  Holy Roman Empire ʺgoodʺ money practice  1618‐23 
2  The Dutch Tulip Bulb bubble  1636 
3  The South Sea and Mississippi bubble  1720 
4  The late 1920s stock crash  1927‐29 
5  The surge in the bank loans to Mexico and other developing 
countries 
1976‐79 
6  The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan  1985‐89 
7  Bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway and Sweden  1985‐89 
8  Real estate and stock crash in East Asian countries  1992‐97 
9  The surge in foreign investment in Mexico  1990‐93 
10  The bubble in over the counter stocks in US  1995‐2000 
  
Table 1 Historical description of most effective financial distresses 
Source: Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Aliber (2005) Manias, panics and crashes p.8  
 
 
During financial crisis period in the last 100 years extremely large deviations in the value of 
foreign exchanges was observed which cannot be inferred from the differences in the national 
inflation rates between the respective countries. The scope of “overshooting” and 
“undershooting” of national currencies were quite extensive and much larger than in any 
previous periods. 
 
Also the number of bank failures during last 3 decades were much numerous than in any 
preceding periods. Several of these failures can be restricted as national events, which rooted 
in making large bets in exchange rate movements (Franklin National Bank in US, Herstatt AG 
in Germany), unreasonable increasing in the size of credit for gaining market share in short 
period of time (Credit Lyonnais, France), collapse of the junk bond market in the early 1990s, 
etc. But, most of the bank failures in 1980s and 1990s were systemic and involved all or most 
of the banks in that country. Such as implosion of asset price bubble in Japan, sudden 
depreciation of national currency in Mexico, Brasil, Argentina in the early 1980s, etc.  
 
 8
It is very complicated and tricky to differentiate which one leads to which. In some cases 
foreign exchange crises trigger bank crises, and in other cases bank crises lead to foreign 
exchange crises. The cost of these bank failures proves to be very high in terms of lost share 
of GDP, slowdowns in the rate of economic growth. 
     
These recorded bank failures can be described as coming in three “waves”: at the beginning of 
1980’s, at the beginning of 1990s, and in the second half of 1990s. These periods of financial 
crashes, that involved in bank failures, large changes in exchange rates and asset price 
bubbles were systematically related to rapid changes in the economic environment and with 
each other. For example, the implosion of the real estate bubble in Japan in the late 1980s led 
to an increase in the flow of money from Japan to East Asian countries and the US. Large 
flow of money lead to the appreciation of respective country currencies and brought forward 
an increase in the price of real estate and securities due to increased demand. When bubbles 
imploded in South East Asian countries freed money flew to another ‘safe harbor’ considered 
by investors in that time, which is to the US. As a result US dollar appreciated and the US 
trade deficit increased to 500 billion US dollar. 
 
The increase in the flow of money to the country almost always results in increase of asset 
prices within the country. Due to increased demand local resident sell the asset they hold, and 
money received from the sale they spend to buy other securities from own domestic residents. 
That makes money received from foreign investors like a “hot potato”, nobody willing to keep 
it for a long time.        
 
In the next chapter we will discuss the origin of financial crises, factors creating favorable 
conditions for their emergence or in short, we will examine the "anatomy” of financial crises. 
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 1.2 Anatomy of a typical financial crisis, international contagion 
effect 
 
Development of financial crises takes a certain path, and each of them has uniqueness of its 
own. As Leo Tolstoy mentioned ‘Every happy family is the same. Every unhappy family is 
miserable in its own way’.  Nevertheless, it is possible to track general framework for 
evaluating and analyzing crisis situations, sorting out reasons and causes, impacts on the 
economical and social levels. 
 
There are different views regarding explanation of financial crises.  Up-to-date vision of the 
problem is divided into two camps, those associated with monetarist view (Friedman, 
Schwartz) versus more eclectic view shared by Kindleberger and Minsky. Members of the 
first ‘camp’ correlate financial crises with the banking panics. According to them, situation 
that involves banking system’s crack can be linked to the emergence of the financial crises. 
Because only in this case there happens contraction in the money supply, which in its turn 
leads to the decline in the economic activity in the country.  Friedman and Schwartz don’t 
consider real estate price bubbles, asset price declines, business failures as per se financial 
crisis unless there is an involvement of banking panic and decline in the money supply, seeing 
them as ‘pseudo financial crises’.  
 
Contrary to the first view, Kindleberger and Minsky give more general framework than 
monetarists. They include sudden decline in asset prices, failure of large financial and non-
financial companies, turmoil in the FOREX markets, or combination of all these under the 
term Financial Crises. As all above mentioned points have the potential of severely affecting 
the fundamentals of an economy, and therefore the authors propose more frequent 
government intervention during financial crises. Minsky highlighted the changes in the supply 
of credit, which increased during boom periods and declined during economic slowdowns. 
Since during expansion period investors become more optimistic about the future, they revise 
upwards their estimates of profitability of a wide range of investments and so they become 
more eager to borrow. At the same time, both the lenders’ assessment and their awareness of 
the risk of individual investments decline and they become more willing to make loans, 
including some investments that previously seemed too risky. When economic conditions 
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slow, the investors become less optimistic and more cautious. At the same time, the loan 
losses of the lenders increase and they become much more cautious4
 
These changes in the supply of credit are believed to be one of the determining conditions 
leading to fragility of the systems, and subsequent financial crises. The start of the crises 
linked to some outside shock to the macroeconomic system that shifts expectations and 
economic outlook to the positive level, and company and individuals would borrow to take 
advantage of emerged profit opportunities. Investments will increase; demand will expand 
that exert power on the production capabilities leading to higher prices. This boom will be 
fueled by credit expansion. This process will continue spirally and increase in the prices will 
turn out to be unsustainable in the long run. Smart insiders will pocket profit from buying low 
selling high, while outsiders will bear the risk that one day they cannot realize the profit 
enough to cover interest charges on the loans that enabled them to buy those assets. The signal 
that precipitates crises could be a failure of a bank, uncovered fraud by an investor, 
bankruptcy of major financial or non-financial company. The rush on the money will spur 
price decline, since nobody wants to stay inside when ‘doors will be shut’.  
 
In order to have more insight why financial crises occur, we need to do some taxonomy. By 
analyzing factors causing financial crises we can differentiate five factors5: 
 
1.  Increases in the interest rate – as a result of asymmetric information and adverse selection 
problem there can be credit rationing so that the candidates who applies for a loan are denied 
for the credit. Clearly clients with the highest riskiness of investment projects are willing to 
pay such high interest rates. Therefore, increase in the interest rate leads to even higher 
adverse selection problem which lifts up probability of bad loans. So, if the interest rate is 
driven up in the economy either because of higher demand for credit or contraction of the 
money supply, the possibility of lending to high risk investor increases as well. Therefore 
lenders will want to make fewer loans leading to decline in extended financing, resulting in 
lower investment and economic activity. Experience shows that even small rise of interest 
rates can lead to significant decline in lending or even  to the start of financial collapse. 
 
                                                 
4 Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Aliber (2005) Manias, panics and crashes. Wiley p. 21-22 
5 Frederick S. Mishkin (1992). Anatomy of financial crises. Evolutionary Economics p.120-122 
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2. Stock market declines - Collateral serves as a tool decreasing adverse selection problem 
when debtor is provided with a loan, since creditor can cover up losses from unpaid loan by 
realizing collateral. When it comes to a company, the net worth of the company – real assets 
and future income streams – play a role of collateral, since creditors have priority in access to 
the company assets in case it goes bankrupt. When stocks of the company go down, as result 
of increasing interest rates, it makes the future stream of income of less value, or decreases 
value of real assets due to decrease in the economic activity, thus the net worth of those firms 
also shrinks. Because of less reliance on the net worth of debtors, creditors decrease lending, 
and firms engage in more risky investments as not much left to lose now. That is why sharp 
decline in the stock prices leads to reduced lending and economic activity.  
 
3. Increases in uncertainty -   Dramatic increase in uncertainty due to recession, collapse of 
high respected company, etc leads to even higher possibility of adverse selection, asymmetric 
information. Increasing inability to solve these problems brings about more reluctance to lend, 
causing decline in investment, and economic activity. 
 
4. Bank panics – asymmetric information is the source of this effect. When uneasy times 
come, depositors fear about the soundness of their funds in the banks. Therefore, they rush to 
withdraw their savings from the banking system, causing multiple contractions in deposits, 
which further exacerbate lending abilities. As panic spreads out no difference is made 
between healthy and bankrupt banks, thus all banking system suffering from it. Banks 
increase the reserves in relation to loans trying to protect themselves from possible outflows. 
The net result is that lending is reduced, economics activity suffers. 
 
5. Unanticipated decline in the price levels – it affects the net worth of the company, since 
extended loans are stated in nominal terms, however declining prices raise the value of 
liabilities in real terms without affecting the real value of the assets of the firm.  
 
Considering the above mentioned factors’ ability to interfere with the efficient functioning of 
financial markets we can draw a picture of a typical financial crisis now.  
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Adverse selection and moral hazard problems worsen. 
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Bank        
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crisis 
Debt 
deflation 
 
 
Figure 1 Sequence of events in a financial crisis.  
Source: Anatomy of financial crises (1992), Frederick S. Mishkin 
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International Financial Crises -- With the advent of globalization, sophistication of 
telecommunication technology that enabled transfer of funds within different financial 
markets with the speed of light, international financial markets started to grow in the second 
half of the 20th century. It is not a wonder that the scale and impact of financial crises, 
happening in the last two decades of the millennium was of a regional, as well as of a global 
scale. We can say that international financial crisis phenomenon developed.  
 
International financial crisis is a situation when the international dimension substantially 
worsens a crisis in ways that would not occur in a closed economy6.  However it doesn’t 
mean that domestic fundamental weaknesses should be underestimated when considering the 
sources of international financial crises.  
 
There have been several major international financial crises during the 1990s: Mexico in 
1995, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, and Brazil in 
1998-99. Notwithstanding the difference between these crises, some common elements can be 
defined for all of them: 
 after a period of substantial capital inflows, investors (both domestic and international) 
decide to reduce the stock of their assets in the affected country in response to a 
change in its fundamentals; 
 after this process went on for some time, investors shifted their focus from evaluating 
the situation in the country to evaluating the behavior of other investors; 
 withdrawal of capital and the associated sharp swing in the exchange rate and reduced 
access to capital exacerbated fundamentals weakness, in turn exacerbating the 
financial market response.7   
 
Another feature of 1990s turmoil is the presence of international contagion. There are many 
different models and explanation of the ‘contagion’ effect.8  
 It can be due to common shocks hurting the commodity exporting countries in the 
same time; 
                                                 
6 Lawrense H. Summers (May, 2000) International Financial Crises: causes, prevention and cures. The American 
Economic Review, Vol 90 no 2 
7 Lawrense H. Summers (May, 2000) International Financial Crises: causes, prevention and cures. The American 
Economic Review, Vol 90 no 2 
8 Ibid p. 6 
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 Strong relations between countries leads to transfer price and income shocks, a.k.a. 
‘spillover’ effect; 
 Competitive devaluations among countries that compete among themselves; 
 Financial linkage: the country that invests in assets of another country is affected by 
the bad news from the latter; 
 Market illiquidity can be the cause: when faced with margin calls and liquidity issues 
they can be forced to withdraw funds from other countries, reducing their position and 
feeding the contagion; 
 Irrationality of investors, such as panic, herding, positive feedback trading, may 
induce them to withdraw money from other countries as well without making careful 
analysis of the fundamentals.  
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1.3 The role of moral hazard and adverse selection phenomena in 
financial crises 
 
Existence of effectively functioning financial market is crucial in achieving economic growth 
and development in emerging markets. Financial system plays an important function in the 
economy by enabling movement of freely available funds from individuals and entities with 
excessive capital and lack of productive opportunities to individual and entities that have such 
opportunities. If any disruption happens in the system, it means that allocation of funds is not 
optimal any more, contraction of economic activity is expected and achievement of economic 
growth and welfare is under threat. 
 
What can cause the disruption in the financial system? The reason can be the asymmetric 
information phenomenon, which is cited as imperfection of the market economy. Asymmetric 
information takes place when one party to the financial contract has much less accurate 
information than the other party. When loan is taken a borrower will usually have much better 
information about the riskiness and return on the investment that is financed with the money 
provided by lender, who in its turn has much less information, unless additional efforts is 
spend by him on finding out more information.  
 
Asymmetric information leads to the following basic problems: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. In this chapter we will discuss the role of moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems in causing financial crises situations.  
  
Moral hazard is the effect of insurance on insured’s behavior.9 Moral hazard has been a 
long-time concern in insurance industry, however in the wake of relatively recent events it has 
been recognized as a concern in banking and other financial industries as well. For example, 
government guarantees of bank deposits, explicit or implicit, reduce the incentives for 
depositors to monitor the banks where their money is invested. And this lack of monitoring 
can affect banks in such a way that they can take excessive amount of risk. Moral hazard can 
also be a valid cause when financial institutions are considered as "too big to fail”. With 
expectation to be bailed-out these institutions do not hesitate investing in excessive risky 
assets. 
                                                 
9 Edward S. Prescott. A primer on Moral-Hazard Models (1999) Economic Quarterly Volume 85/1 
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 Moral hazard occurs when transaction has already been carried out between parties in the 
financial market. The HAZARD is that borrower could have incentives to engage in activities 
that are undesirable from lender’s point of view, i.e. those activities that will make it much 
less likely that borrower’s money will be paid out.  
 
The role played by moral hazard problem during financial crises reveals itself in the fact that 
lax domestic regulation leads to excessive risk taking by financial institutions. Furthermore, 
the expectation of IMF bail-outs to the developing country bank sector gives foreign investors 
an incentive to invest in those risky assets. First one is the example of debtor moral hazard, 
whereas second example is the creditor moral hazard.  
 
Moral hazard problem is usually formulated in terms of contract between a principal and an 
agent who works for him, which can be a person or an institution. With regard to moral 
hazard problem in financial crisis situation, we can point out that principal in this case is the 
IMF that gives explicit and implicit guarantees, and the agent is the banks and other financial 
institutions that expect the help to be extended during bank runs or investors expecting their 
risky investments to be bailed out.    
 
Adverse selection – occurs before the transaction between parties has been carried out. The 
problem is that potential bad risks are the ones who most actively seek out a loan, those who 
are most likely to produce ADVERSE outcome are most likely to be chosen. In particular, 
insurance system will often not be profitable, if buyers have better information about their risk 
of claiming the damage than seller does. When there is an adverse selection, clients who know 
that they have higher risk of claiming the damage than the average of the group, they will be 
more eager to buy the insurance. Whereas those who have below-average risk may decide it is 
too expensive to be worth buying. In this case, premiums set according to the average risk 
will not be sufficient to cover the claims that eventually arise, because among the people who 
have bought the policy more will have above-average risk than below-average risk. Putting up 
the premium will not solve this problem, because as the premium rises the insurance policy 
will become unattractive to more of the potential clients who know that they have a lower risk 
of claiming. One way to reduce adverse selection is to make the purchase of insurance 
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compulsory, so that those for whom insurance priced for average risk is unattractive are not 
able to opt out.10
 
In the financial system, the same can be translated into loans market. The classic “lemons 
problem” is a part of this adverse selection problem which was first described by Akerlof 
(1970). Lemons problem occur in the debt and equity markets when it is hard to distinguish 
whether a lender has good investment opportunities with low risk that is good risk, or 
alternatively has bad investment opportunities with high risk, that is bad risk. Therefore in 
this situation lender will only be willing to pay the price that reflects the average quality of the 
securities to be issued. Managers of high quality security issuing company understand that the 
assigned price is lower than ingenious value of the security and will not sell their securities. 
On the other hand, the securities that will be offered for sale in the market will be those of 
lower quality firms, because they know that the price offered is higher than value of the 
security.   
 
Combining these two problems together, we can see that they lead to inefficiencies in the 
financial system. As we have seen in the definition of financial crisis (p.5) exactly the 
disruption in the financial markets causes the creation of situations suitable for financial 
distress and crisis.  
 
Certain rules and regulations have been introduced by government authorities to curb the 
negative effect stemming from adverse selection and moral hazard, such as safety net for 
depositors, restrictions on bank asset holdings, capital requirements, disclosure requirements, 
chartering, and bank examinations (with intention to decrease adverse selection and moral 
hazard). However, not always these measures have been successful, sometimes leading to the 
exacerbation of the situation even more.  
 
Banks and financial institutions aim at decreasing the problem with asymmetric information, 
reducing the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection by extending selective private loans 
and controlling creditworthiness of borrowers. However, they create another asymmetric 
information problem because this time depositors are lacking information about the quality of 
private loans, which may result in bank panics explained above as one of the reasons of 
                                                 
10 www.economist.com  
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financial crises. When external shock hits the country, some percentage of the banks will be 
insolvent due to large loan losses deriving from bad loans. But depositors do not know which 
banks have bad loans and which do not have. Therefore, there will be bank runs, everybody 
trying to get out their money as soon as possible until bank has enough funds to return all 100 
cent per dollar deposited. Thus even solvent banks will be in trouble because of huge amount 
of cash outflow which can not be covered with current funds available.  
 
Government safety net, deposit insurance being one of its forms, can short bank runs. Since 
depositors believe that even if banks will have large losses, deposit insurance enables to get 
back all deposited funds. Another way of assuring that bank runs can be handled is 
government playing a role of lender of last resort, directly providing funds to troubled 
institutions so that depositors can receive their money.  The degree of moral hazard may differ 
among the named two types of government safety net. Deposit insurance protects all 
depositors, regardless whether shock happened in banking system is systematic or 
idiosyncratic (affecting only single bank); all depositors will be paid back. When it comes to 
implicit promise by government to act as a lender of last resort, the decision to bail out 
troubled banks may depend on the level of shock, if it is idiosyncratic there is no full 
assurance that one bank will be bailed out. Therefore, banks will keep in mind that in case 
such situation happens, depositors will be willing to withdraw their deposits. Thus in terms of 
safety net based moral hazard we can say that it may differ depending on the type chosen.   
 
The most serious drawback of both deposit insurance and lender of last resort stems from 
MORAL HAZARD problem, because existence of insurance in any form increases incentives 
towards risk taking that can result in insurance payoff. Depositors will not care much about 
exerting control over the riskiness of banks loans, imposing the discipline of the marketplace 
on the banks. Therefore banks provided with safety net can take on greater risks than they 
otherwise would have done. Another problem rising with safety net solution is the adverse 
selection problem, where the people who are most likely to produce adverse outcome will be 
the ones who wants most of all to take advantage of the insurance. 
 
We are not going into detail regarding other types of bank regulations that keep negative 
effect of adverse selection and moral hazard down. Our focus will be more on the moral 
hazard problem arising from IMF’s provision of implicit safety net guarantees to emerging 
countries in the form of bail out loans, thus playing a role of an international lender of last 
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resort. As we have seen in our explanation already, moral hazard problem and in particular 
adverse selection may result in situations stimulating financial crisis.  
  
The next step in our research will be an attempt to quantify the effect of moral hazard in 
development of financial crises situations. With this purpose we will look into EMBI 
spreads, and determine correlation between these two. 
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Part 2 Lenders of last resort, intervention plans 
 
2.1 Lender of last resort: domestic and international 
 
According to Kindleberger (2005) “the lender of last resort stands ready to halt a run out of 
real assets and illiquid financial assets into money by supplying as much money as may be 
necessary to forestall the run; the concept of elastic supply of money that expands to meet the 
demand in panics.” But there are still questions left to be answered: How much money? To 
whom? On what terms? and When? 
 
In addition to finding reasonable answers to above stated question, lenders of last resort also 
face the following phenomenon: if investors believe that banks and other selected borrowers 
will be supported in the moments of distress by a lender of last resort, they will be less 
cautious, less risk averse when extending loans during the next economic boom periods. The 
public good of the lender of last resort weakens the responsibility of private lenders to ensure 
that they make sound loans (example of a moral hazard problem). However, if a rush from 
sales of securities and commodities into money cannot be halted, the fallacy of composition 
takes center stage. The sale of these assets by investors in an effort to minimize losses leads to 
declines in the asset prices, with the consequences that a large number of otherwise solvent 
and well-capitalized firms may become bankrupt.11
 
Therefore, moral hazard problem is anticipated to be a side effect when lender of last resort is 
involved to the process of salvation of crisis affected financial system. So, the questions arise: 
whether there is a need at all for the lender of last resort and how benefits from having such 
an instance of last resort are not outweighing the costs of introducing it?  
 
Domestic lender of last resort  
As it was explained previously, contraction of money base would cause financial distress. 
Depositors in a panic worrying about probable insolvency of all financial institutions will 
create bank runs, taking out their savings in cash, thus leading to reduction in broad money 
available to the market. This problem can be eroded by intervention from the lender of last 
resort, which can maintain the overall broad money indicator in equilibrium by increasing 
                                                 
11 Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Aliber (2005) Manias, panics and crashes. Wiley 
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monetary base. In most countries the sole right of printing money is in the hands of Central 
Banks, so logically they are supposed to act as a domestic lender of last resort.  
 
But there are still questions to be answered, such as when is the right time for the lender of 
last resort to engage in mitigating effects of financial crisis, what amount the bailout should 
be, and who should receive help? These are the questions that pose the most challenge for 
lenders of last resort, incorrect answers to which may lead to even more severe crises in the 
future. 
 
However, opinions are divided on these issues. Regarding timing of intervention in a market, 
the most optimal way is said to wait long enough for the insolvent firms to fail after the 
financial crash, but not too long as to let the crisis to spread to the solvent firms that need 
liquidity. On the amount of funds to be injected to market, according Bagehot’s rule (who was 
the editor of the Economist in the end of 19th century) lending should be carried out freely at a 
penalty rate. Freely means that only to solvent borrowers and with good collateral, subject to 
inevitable exceptions12. The method of supply of money might be conducted via open market 
purchases rather than through discount mechanism. Quoting the same Bagehot, it is suggested 
that loans for bail-out should be granted to all comers on the basis of sound collateral as 
largely as public asks for them. But the dilemma about collateral is that its soundness rooted 
in how long has the panic progressed; the longer the panic is continued, the sharper the 
decline in prices will be, and less sound the collateral will be assessed. In this case the look at 
the character of the borrower becomes more important. This last advice was used by J.P. 
Morgan quite widely during financial crises periods.  
 
The role of lender of last resort appears when certain institution accepts responsibility for the 
stability of the banking system as a whole, which should override any concern with its own 
private profitability. There are different views on the role of this institution. First, should it 
involve the rescue of individual institution? Second, should it mean the rescue of the market 
as a whole? It is not wise to commit oneself to giving support to any individual bank that will 
face problems with liquidity. As we have seen it would involve too much moral hazard 
problem. Therefore, the main point is that the lender should not try to rescue each and every 
                                                 
12 Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Aliber (2005) Manias, panics and crashes. Wiley, p. 208 
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bank that stays in the edge of bankruptcy as a result of insolvency, but rather should provide 
liquidity to the market instead.   
 
International Lender of Last Resort  
Primary responsibility of the domestic lender of last resort is to make sure that there is enough 
liquidity when sudden financial distress and precautionary selling leads to insolvency 
problem. Whereas, international lender of last resort takes responsibility over the provision of 
liquidity for improving the scope of necessary changes in the exchange rate to make sure that 
they match with the long-run equilibrium values, but not to prevent changes that are required 
by the fundamentals. Another remedy provided by international lender of last resort is to stand 
in the way of transmission of deflationary pressure from one country to another, so called 
contagion problem.   
 
International lender of last resort has no domestic counter parts, since national currencies and 
central banks are all different,  and making changes in exchange rate inevitable.  When it 
comes to the financial crises at the international level, domestic lenders of last resort cannot 
help much. As there are national currencies with national central banks in each country, 
changes in the exchange rates and the possibility of international contagion calls for 
involvement of international lender of last resort. 
 
The possibility of coordination problems among creditors is the main argument in favor of 
international lenders of last resort.13 When country faces illiquidity problem it is not easy to 
get new loans in a short period of time. This is not because there is a shortage in the financial 
markets, but rather, a) there isn’t large enough private investor to be able to take upon 
coordination problem of providing funds for covering illiquidity, b) uncertainty about 
fundamentals of economy develops doubts about the solvency of the debtor country. 
 
But experience shows that pure liquidity problem is not the sole problem during financial 
crises. As a rule weak fundamentals and unsound policy precedes liquidity shortages in crises 
affected countries.  Our next discussion will cover the reasons countries approached IMF, 
who we see as an organization to play the role of international lender of last resort, and how 
these reasons changed over time.   
                                                 
13 Giancarlo C., Bernardo G., and Nouriel R. (Dec. 2003). International lending of last resort: a model of IMF’s 
catalytic finance. NBER working paper 
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 2.2 IMF’s role in resolving financial crises: historical review 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944 to enable extension of credits 
among countries and aid in combating foreign exchange crises. However until the Mexican 
‘tequila’ crisis in 1994 there wasn’t clear sign if IMF can be international lender of last resort.  
 
Since the day of its foundation IMF has showed considerable development, both 
geographically and functionally. Currently, the Fund has more than 180 member countries, 
with total quota equaling to 317 billion USD, and current outstanding loan in the level of 28 
billion USD to 74 countries.14  
 
Article I of the Articles of Agreement sets out the IMF's main responsibilities as the 
following: 
• promoting international monetary cooperation; 
• facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of international trade; 
• promoting exchange stability; 
• assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; 
• making its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members experiencing 
balance of payments difficulties.15 
 
Making a historical review of IMF activities, starting from the moment of its initiation, we 
can receive an insight into how IMF and its role in dealing with financial crises evolved 
throughout time, and whether IMF can really be considered as the international lender of last 
resort in the modern time. 
 
IMF’s Article of Agreements described above, was drafted at Bretton Woods in 1944. The 
purpose standing behind creation of this institution was the intention to prevent upheaval of 
autarky type of governance that so many countries resorted to after the First World War. The 
kind of governance that were seen as a reason for depression in 1930s, stifling international 
trade. Another reason for the establishment of IMF was international finance perspective. As 
                                                 
14 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm 
15 Ibid 
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it was stated by one of the founders of IMF by John Maynard Keynes:“…make unnecessary 
those methods of restriction and discrimination which countries adopted... as measures of self 
protection from disruptive outside forces”.  The stipulation tied with this premise was that 
capital outflows should be related to the need of financing trade on the current account. There 
was a fear that autonomous and speculative capital outflows would lead to unsustainable 
reserve losses in countries that would seek to offset it by borrowing from the IMF. It was 
stated that only when capital exports are net, large, sustained, and motivated chiefly by the 
desire for speculative profit the Fund is likely to require a restriction of capital exports as a 
condition for continued use of Fund's borrowing. Article VI of the Articles of Agreements 
reflects these views. IMF refused from financing large and unsustainable financial flows, 
encouraged countries to impose controls on such movements of capital and reserved a right to 
deny credits to those countries that fail to exercise necessary control measures. However in 
the wake of globalization of international financial flows this clause was a kind of 
impediment and only in 1997 did the amendment of the article took place, thus giving IMF 
mandate for full promotion of free capital flow. 
 
During the first ten years of its life as international financial institution, IMF extended lending 
to the countries with the aim to retain currency convertibility for current account transactions 
at fixed exchange rates.  
 
The first time when the Fund was asked for help during crisis period was in 1956, in the 
aftermath of Suez Canal crisis. After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, France, England and 
Israel evoked attack on Egypt with the intention to get back authority to Suez International 
Company. After 2 month of confrontation all four countries turned to IMF for help. 
Apparently it was more of a political crisis than a financial crisis. Still IMF was seen as a 
crisis manager. Because of military operations there was a strain on the economic situation in 
all countries participating in Suez Canal crisis, which affected the status of their current 
accounts. IMF allocated tranches for those countries that was involved into the conflict, and 
allocated amount was intended for solving current account deficits, for all except the UK. 
Because the UK was suffering speculative short term capital outflows that were threatening 
depreciation in the exchange rate. IMF came to the conclusion that if not helped now, 
imposing exchange restriction later would eventually lead to suppression in trade, affecting 
current account anyway. Total amount drawn by all these countries in tranches was equal to 
1.7 billion US dollar.   
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 The capital account as an independent issue became more important at the beginning of 
1960s, when most developed countries has reestablished convertibility for current account 
transactions. During this period industrialized countries started to take apart obstacles in the 
way of free capital movement, which was only welcomed by IMF. But after this event took 
place most industrial countries saw short-term capital outflows from their own “pockets”. 
This urged them to impose additional restriction on the way of capital outflows, such as 
interest equalization tax by the United States. Established measures were effective and capital 
outflow seemed to slow down. 
 
However, those disruptive capital flows lead to the second major international economic crisis 
which was the collapse of the Gold Pool in 1968. Price of the gold was decided to be kept 
stable at 35$ per ounce by the central banks of eight developed countries. Inflationary 
pressure and rising demand was very insisting on price changes, which were suppressed for 
some time by the usage of foreign exchange reserves. When losses on reserves were too high 
to be acceptable, it was decided to abandon official Gold Pool. The most affected country 
from this gold price maintenance, whose resources were not strong enough to withstand the 
onslaught, was the UK that was forced to devaluate its currency and take 1.4 billion USD 
worth credit from IMF.  
 
What was more striking about the late 1960s, viewed from the perspective of 1990s, is that 
the role of IMF was confined to the realm of economic policy and was linked only indirectly 
to the events in financial markets16. It was apparent that IMF did not involve in directly 
solving the crises. But IMF did help in persuading British government that devaluation of 
pound was inescapable, evaluated the necessary size of parity changes.      
 
In the 1970s current account deficits weren’t anymore short term problems for the most 
industrialized countries. These outflows were blamed on ‘hot’ money speculations, and the 
cause was explained by overly expansionary macroeconomic policies. The reason was 
economical; however effects were both economical and financial. Combined with the oil 
deficit in 1974, those current account deficits were not able to be financed at the current 
system of exchange rates. These deficits were financed in increasing extent by short-term 
                                                 
16 James M. Boughton (2000). From Suez to Tequila: the IMF as a crisis manager. The Economic Journal, 110 
January 
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capital flows from Eurocurrency markets. The exchange market crisis in 1973 brought in the 
era of floating exchange rates. As a result both the UK and Italy developed negative balance 
of payments and turned to IMF for substantial financial help.  
 
But IMF still was not involved directly into resolving the crisis situations. The fund provided 
technical assistance for establishing new set of exchange rate rules. Allowing currencies to 
float freely obviated a direct financing role of IMF and paved way for dealing with financial 
crises in more direct ways. 
 
Two oil price shocks facilitated the flow of additional fund which started to pile up in oil 
exported countries, to the bank accounts in industrialized countries. Now, oil importing 
countries experienced current account deficit amounting 25% of their export, and their debt 
service ratio has risen to 19%. But capital were still flowing freely to developing countries, 
but now at more steadily increasing prices, thus increasing the burden to the borrowers.  
 
The major turning point both for the international financial system and for the crisis 
management role of the IMF came in 1982. The debt crisis started in 1980s when industrial 
countries stopped extending new credits and rolling over existing credits to the developing 
countries. Those developing countries were characterized as supporting increased domestic 
spending with the borrowed money, also with deficiencies in administration and public 
policy. This is was a pure financial crisis, compared to the previous ones, which were seen as 
economical and short term.  
 
IMF, the only institution with authority and resources stepped forward. This rationale of IMF 
taking on of crisis manager role had different elements to be considered:  
• those heavily indebted developing countries would have defaulted if help didn’t arrive;  
• this default would be a big threat to international financial system;  
• giving new loans were a sound strategy if combined with healthy macroeconomic 
policies;  
• neither financing nor reforms can be obtained without intervention.   
 
So both IMF’s role and debt strategy evolved between the start of crisis and its resolution in 
1989. When Mexican and Asian crises erupted in 1990s most elements of the role that IMF 
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should have played were all in place. In order to be able to apply large loans IMF developed 
exceptional circumstances clause. 
 
Considering that IMF didn’t act as a lender of last resort with using funds exceeding the quota 
of the country several times until 1990s, it gives us the possibility to uncover relations 
between IMF sponsored lending to provide liquidity to financially distressed countries and 
moral hazard problem. By making comparisons before and after the IMF intervention, starting 
from Mexican crises, we can track any existing correlations. Here we will take a smooth 
passage to the last part of my thesis where this problem will be investigated and results 
uncovered.   
 
 28
Part 3 Analytical framework for detecting level of 
correlation between IMF interventions and subsequent 
financial crises 
 
3.1 IMF funding during financial crisis period and moral hazard 
 
There is an emerging argument that IMF-led financial packages to countries suffering from 
financial crises have undermined efforts to forestall such crises, typical example of moral 
hazard problem. This argument is gaining “weight” in the view of increased number of cases 
when emerging countries and less but not the least developed countries, is strike by financial 
distress and crises situations.  
 
In the international financial markets two types of moral hazard can be differentiated: debtor 
and creditor. Debtor moral hazard means that the provision of financial bail-outs has induced 
governments of developing countries not to follow sound, but costly policies. Creditor moral 
hazard deals with the prospects of international bail-outs leading creditors to these emerging 
countries to be less cautious in their assessment of insolvency, thus lending at lower spreads 
than they would have done without any expectation of bail-out by IMF or any other financial 
institution. But this distinction cannot be absolute, since in the case of international capital 
flows it is hard to distinguish how much the possible moral hazard effect was due to debtor or 
creditor misbehavior, since both borrowers and creditors interact together.  
 
If we look into the history of IMF-led bail out packages or concerted lending of commercial 
banks or other financial institutions (table 2), we can see that these financing started to take 
the large scale effect only with the beginning of Mexican financial crisis in 1995. Before this 
period IMF engaged only in partial support through financing current account deficits, and 
providing financial help rarely exceeding assigned quotas of the countries. This observation 
will help us in carrying out our testing of the effect of moral hazard in stimulating financial 
crises, since we can compare indicators prior to year 1995 and the ones after year 1995 to 
make conclusions whether IMF-led exceptional funding really leads to distortion of incentives 
in home countries. However we will extend these discussions in the next chapter.  
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Country  Headline package  IMF loan 
Mexico 1995  $48.8 billion  $17.8 billion (690% of quota) 
Thailand 1997  $17.2 billion  $3.9 billion (500% of quota) 
Indonesia 1997  $33.0 billion  $10.1 billion (490% of quota) 
Korea 1997  $55.0 billion  $21.0 billion (1940% of quota) 
Russia 1998  $22.6 billion  $11.2 billion (210% of quota) 
Brazil 1998  $41.6 billion  $18.1 billion (600% of quota) 
Argentina 2000  $39.7 billion  $13.7 billion (500% of quota) 
Turkey 2000  $13.8 billion  $10.4 billion (830% of quota) 
Brazil 2001    $15.0 billion (400% of quota) 
Turkey 2002    $16.0 billion (1330% of quota) 
Brazil 2002    $35.0 billion (900% of quota) 
Uruguay 2002    $3.0 billion (700% of quota) 
Argentina 2003    $12.5 billion (420% of quota) 
 
 Table 2 Exceptional IMF led support packages: 1995-2003 
Source: Steven B. Kamin (2004) Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets 
 
Almost in every single case of significant international level crises IMF provided support in 
several times exceeding the assigned quota of the country in IMF, which was not the case 
before year 1995. The frequency with which financial crises started to emerge could be a sign 
that both debtors and creditors might be relaxed due to the expectation of support packages 
from IMF, thus allowing them to behave in ways that makes a crisis more likely. Also 
reduction in the spreads when lending to emerging countries could be an additional proof of 
moral hazard.   
 
It is inherently plausible that IMF’s financing packages generate some elements of moral 
hazard. The presence of IMF funds would encourage investors to take upon such risks that 
they would not otherwise take. But, it is not necessarily “evil”, because named policy exactly 
in line with Article I of the IMF’s Article of Agreements which states that one of the purposes 
of IMF is “giving confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporary available to them under adequate safeguards... without resorting to measures 
 30
destructive of national or international prosperity"17. What we should be concerned about is 
whether the availability of funds from IMF encourages imprudent risks to be taken and 
whether these additional risks weights heavier than benefits associated with IMF financing in 
curbing costs of crises.   
 
First, let us consider how exactly moral hazard problem could be a side effect of IMF’s 
financial support. As we already discussed, moral hazard arises when the provision of 
insurance increases the probability of the event being insured against, usually by diminishing 
the incentives for the insured party to take preventive actions. Any type of insurance is subject 
to moral hazard as long as the behavior of the insured party can influence the probability of 
the event insured against and investor cannot respond fully (by adjusting terms or canceling 
coverage) to behavior that leads to increase in event’s probability. Another feature of moral 
hazard problem is that investors are taking risks now based on the assessment of the support 
that they are supposed to get in the future when “things will go wrong”.  
 
How different is the possible moral hazard from IMF financing from conventional insurance 
related moral hazard? One of the major differences is that Fund’s financial support is not pure 
cash payout, but on the contrary it is a loan that should be paid back with accrued interests.  
So, what lures investors in decreasing risks that they take, is the insurance benefit paid by the 
Fund, which is reflected in the difference of interest rate at which country could otherwise 
borrow during financial crisis period (which usually very high) and the rate charged by IMF 
(which is tied to market rates in the industrial countries).  
 
Therefore, it is more useful to compare the role played by the IMF with that played by 
national central bank as a lender of last resort, because in both cases the financing intends to 
temporarily address liquidity rather than insolvency issues. When central banks’ role as a 
lender of last resort induce banks to hold fewer cash and reserves, in the same way IMF’s 
intended role of international lender of last resort may similarly reduce countries’ thrust to 
hold international reserves. Just like central banks’ expected support during liquidity 
problems of the banks may lead depositors to be less cautious in investing with these banks, 
IMF’s financial support to crises affected countries may increase the incentive of investors to 
these countries to take risky and unsustainable policies.  
                                                 
17 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm 
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 But, comparing with domestic lender of last resort there are some very important differences. 
Central banks have in principle unlimited resources, which is reflected in their ability to print 
money when needed. Here we will not judge whether it is sound or not to have such a tool. 
However, IMF’s financing source is created as a result of pooling of funds from member 
countries and the procedure of increase of total available funds could be painstaking and long 
enough. As we have witnessed, such a problem was faced during the change in the size of 
IMF's total resources in 1997, which were held open until US congress ratified it. 
 
Also central banks have certain tools in their arsenal that could limit moral hazard resulting 
from unlimited financing; such as supervisory and regulatory responsibilities to uncover 
imprudent behavior, and power to close the banks engaged in risky investment and evaluated 
as being not solvent. When it comes to IMF, its surveillance may play similar role in detecting 
countries which break the boundaries of prudent behavior, and its terms of conditionality of 
the loans provided under the umbrella of IMF facilitate expected policy adjustments. 
However, these tools are considerably weaker than tools used by central banks and IMF 
definitely cannot afford itself to “shut down” countries deemed to be insolvent. 
 
One practical difficulty arises during the assessment of the effect of availability of IMF’s 
financing on the emergence of moral hazard: it is the difficulty in specifying the 
counterfactual. If IMF support were not available then crises affected country would probably 
resort to other alternatives, such as a larger depreciation of its currency thus leading to 
inflation of its local currency debts, and also chance of default on its external debt. It is also 
possible to show more complex channels through which IMF financial support may lead to 
moral hazard: such as by underwriting implicit guarantees that make it possible to support 
investors at the expense of its own taxpayers, i.e. using future tax revenues for financing 
current bail outs.   
 
The most important question to be answered is whether IMF financing to emerging countries 
induces any moral hazard which in its turn leads to increased probability of financial crises, 
and if the answer is yes, then whether it is of practical importance to be major concern? 
  
The questions asked here: whether there exists moral hazard problem or not, is not just pure 
curiosity, it has special implications for the policy developments. Taking into account these 
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and some other factors we will try to “dig deep” finding out the relations between these two 
mentioned effects. 
 33
3.2 Analysis of correlation between IMF intervention and the 
degree of moral hazard. 
 
Supporters of the view that moral hazard problem exists and has an important impact on the 
emerging market countries, shows as an evidence the sharp reduction in interest rate spreads 
on credits provided to emerging countries after Mexican crisis, and sudden increase in capital 
flows to emerging market countries during the period between years 1996 – 99. They support 
their arguments by pointing out that it led to relaxed attitude of investors toward inherent risk 
in those countries, because investors became confident that IMF’s provision of exceptional 
financing, just like in Mexican crisis, wouldn't let them to default. While in their point of 
view, on the contrary, failure of IMF to prevent Russian default in 1998 significantly reduced 
the degree of moral hazard in the system which caused a surge in spreads and reduction in 
capital flows into emerging countries, however not eliminating the moral hazard entirely. 
 
Based on these conclusions IMF critics show a big concern whether exceptional financial 
packages for developing countries experiencing financial distress, which exceed the quotas 
several times, should be curtailed. They note that much more effort should be devoted to 
private creditors, by urging them to bear the part of the burden by rolling over, rescheduling 
or even reducing the face value of their loans.  
 
However up-to-date it has been difficult to present full support for the prevalence of creditor 
moral hazard in the international markets. Studies dedicated to moral hazard issue show 
dominantly not in the favor of existence of moral hazard in the system, since according to 
these studies signs of moral hazard, such as reduction in spreads, have not been find out. 
However it is too early to make final conclusions before taking into account additional 
elements that have impact in formation of interest rate spreads; otherwise final conclusion 
would fail to include factors that help to keep up the spreads high, thus making the model not 
consistent or biased.  
 
In this section empirical testing of moral hazard in the international financial markets will be 
conducted. As a benchmark, certain indicators will be used as a basis for comparison. I will 
use the concept that before 1995 Mexican crisis IMF programs did not offer enough financing 
to bail-out foreign investors completely (see part 3.1.), therefore in that period investors 
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couldn't think of IMF financing as a source for support to recover credits when government 
would default on their debts. Hence, I presume that financial indicators we are going to look 
at did not include any degree of moral hazard before year 1995. Therefore, making 
comparison by using data from selected indicators gives us possibility to trace the trend 
whether there was a change since Mexican crisis, thus supporting moral hazard concept. We 
can rely on this method as long as we control for other factors affecting comparison of the 
financial indicators pre 1995 and after 1995 events. 
 
As it was elaborated in the second part of my thesis, IMF's role evolved throughout the last 30 
years. If we take into account international debt crisis in developing countries during 1980s, at 
that times IMF's role in resolving crisis situation was restricted to providing funds for 
financing current account deficits and did not extend enough amounts for financing whole 
repayments. In order to prevent default, concerted approach of private financial institutions, 
creditor and debtor country governments was required. As a result of these efforts some part 
of the debt was restructured, and partly provided money for covering interest payment for due 
payments. Until the end of the 1980s under Brady plan the restructuring and reduction in the 
face value of bank loans were provided, which were collateralized by the Treasury bonds. 
Therefore bail-out of private investors was not the case during 1980s international debt crisis.  
 
Whereas during 1995 Mexican crisis official support package reached 48.8 billion USD, out 
of which 17.8 billion USD was provided by IMF. This loan exceeded Mexico’s quota almost 
700%. Private investors couldn’t have anticipated such bail-out from IMF, therefore we can 
develop the idea that financial indicators present prior to 1995 were “moral hazard free” 
which means that they were not effected somehow by moral hazard concerns, considering we 
control the result by assessing the impact of other relevant factors.   
 
3.2.1 Indicators used for assessing the effect of moral hazard 
 
In this paper Emerging Market Bonds Index developed by JP Morgan will be used as a main 
tool for measuring potential moral hazard related to IMF financing of crises affected 
countries. The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded 
external debt instruments in the emerging markets. The instruments include external-
currency-denominated Brady bonds, loans and Eurobonds, as well as U.S. dollar local 
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markets instruments. The EMBI+ expands upon Morgan's original Emerging Markets Bond 
Index, which was introduced in 1992 and covers only Brady bonds. In addition to serving as a 
benchmark, the EMBI+ provides investors with a definition of the market for emerging 
markets external-currency debt, a list of the instruments traded, and a compilation of their 
terms. 
 
The EMBI+ is concentrated in instruments from the three major Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), reflecting the size and liquidity of these external debt 
markets. The non-Latin countries are represented in the index by Bulgaria, Morocco, Nigeria, 
the Philippines, Poland, Russia, and South Africa.18
 
The J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global), which currently 
covers 27 emerging market countries, is the newest and most comprehensive emerging 
markets debt benchmark to the moment. Included in the EMBI Global are U.S.-dollar-
denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and local market debt instruments issued 
by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. Below the details the EMBI Global’s country 
weights, as well as its regional weights. 
 
The EMBI Global was created in response to investor demand for a benchmark that includes a 
broader array of countries than its predecessor. It expands upon the composition of the 
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+), by using a different country selection process 
and admitting less liquid instruments. 
 
Instead of selecting countries according to a sovereign credit-rating level, as is done with the 
EMBI+, the EMBI Global defines emerging markets countries with a combination of World 
Bank-defined per capita income brackets and each country’s debt-restructuring history. 
These two criteria allow the EMBI Global to include a number of higher-rated countries that 
international investors have nevertheless considered part of the emerging markets universe. 
 
The EMBI Global – like the EMBI+ – will only consider for inclusion emerging markets 
issues denominated in U.S. dollars, with a minimum current face outstanding of US$500 
million and at least 2½ years to maturity. However, the EMBI Global does not require that its 
                                                 
18 http://www2.jpmorgan.com/MarketDataInd/EMBI/embi.html 
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“candidate instruments” satisfy the EMBI+’s series of additional liquidity tests (a minimum 
bid/ask price spread and a specific number of inter-dealer broker quotes). Instead, it only 
requires that easily accessible and verifiable daily prices should be available for the given 
instrument. 19
 
 
Figure 2 EMBI Global: Country and regional compositions 
Source: JP Morgan Securities  
                                                 
19 JP Morgan Website: Methodology of EMBI calculation 
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 When controlling for the factors that may have affected emerging market spreads, we take as 
a basis 3-month and 10-year US Treasury bond yields; Merrill Lynch high yield corporate 
spreads, and Moody’s average credit rating of emerging countries. 
3.2.2 Conducting analysis of collected data 
 
For conducting our analysis we take the indicator of spread of EMBI over the US Treasury 3 
month T-Bills as a major tool (Figure 3). The average index spread from the period of 1992 
until November 1994 is about 320 basis points. According to our methodology if we take 
average EMBI spread before the Mexican crisis of 1995, and compare it with the spread after 
crisis period we can notice that for the most part EMBI after the crisis period is above the 
average line.   
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        Figure 3 EMBI Global spreads 1992-2003 
        Source: JP Morgan  
 
As we can notice during observed period of time EMBI spreads fall below the average line of 
pre-1995 spreads few times: from late 1996 till July 1998, shortly during year 2000 and in 
year 2003. Even if we exclude the effect of Argentinean debt where spreads has skyrocketed 
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as a result of default in 2001, (Figure 4) EMBI spread still would have been above the average 
line. 
 
 
Figure 4 EMBI Spread Argentina vs. Global, 1998 - 2006 
Source: http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/countries/argentina/argembisprd.htm
 
Relying on the result of analysis of above stated figures we can make initial consideration that 
the outcome we received is not in line with the hypothesis that Mexican crisis has led to moral 
hazard problem among investors and debtors.   
 
However it is possible that other additional elements have helped in pushing up the spreads, 
thus not allowing us to have a clear picture of the real effect of moral hazard. Therefore, we 
will plot the EMBI against the factors that are believed to push emerging market spreads up. 
We can summarize the factors as following: 
 US Treasury bond yields; 
 US high yield corporate spreads; 
 The perceived riskiness of emerging market bonds (capitalization weighted average of 
Moody's sovereign credit ratings for countries included in EMBI index). 
 
In our opinion these are the factors that could have the most relevant effect on the emerging 
market bond prices. 
 39
 0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Ja
n-
92
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
94
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
00
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
02
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
04
Ja
n-
05
Time period (1992-2006)
B
as
is
 p
oi
nt
EMBI
T-Bill 3 month maturity
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Ja
n-
92
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
94
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
00
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
02
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
04
Ja
n-
05
B
as
is
 p
oi
nt
Time period (1992-2006)
EMBI
 40
 0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Jan-
92
Jan-
93
Jan-
94
Jan-
95
Jan-
96
Jan-
97
Jan-
98
Jan-
99
Jan-
00
Jan-
01
Jan-
02
Jan-
03
Jan-
04
Jan-
05
Time period (1992-2006)
B
as
is
 p
oi
nt
1
6
11
16
21
EMBI
Moody's sovereign rating
 
 
Source: Pioneer Investments (www.uspioneerinvestments.com) 
    
Figure 5 EMBI yields and external elements  
 
Analyzing results of comparison of EMBI yields with effects of other factors in determining 
moral hazard, we face with mixed evidences. Both 3 month T-bills and 10-year Treasury 
Bond yields are well below of their average in 1992-94, which means that it would not have 
caused increasing EMBI spreads. US high yield corporate spreads throughout the measured 
period were in line with 10 year Treasury index. We have already concluded that Treasury 
bond yields did not much impact with pushing the EMBI yield up. Therefore we logically can 
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infer that US high yield corporate yields also did have little impact on EMBI yields. Also 
Moody’s average credit ratings20 may have posed some pressure in pushing up the EMBI 
spreads, but it is not critical. 
 
In order to finalize our results by looking at the possibility that above mentioned factors were 
pushing EMBI up thus offsetting the effect of moral hazard, the simulation of long run values 
of EMBI implied by the values of US Treasury yields, corporate spreads, and the average 
credit ratings based on the model’s estimated parameters will be tested. That means we will 
estimate the model up till 1994, and then simulate it throughout the period 1995-2003, the 
period where IMF linked moral hazard is supposed to present according to the assumptions 
we have made at the beginning. Then we will compare actual spreads based on the real figures 
with our simulated index of EMBI spreads that represents no moral hazard benchmark. If 
moral hazard was not important before 1995, but substantially depressed spreads afterwards, 
then the actual spreads should have overpredict spreads in pre 1995, and underpredict spreads 
in post 1995.  
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Figure 5 Simulation of EMBI spreads        
                                                 
20 When designing Moody’s average credit rating, I took the average of country ratings, assigning numbers to 
certain degrees of riskiness: from 1 to 24. 24 being the most risky, 1 the least risky (from Ba1 to Caa2). Country 
weights used during calculation were in accordance with their current weights in EMBI. 
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 Actual spreads has shown significant deviations from the average line throughout the 
observed period, mostly explained with sharp rise and falls of US high yield corporate 
securities spreads.  But, for the most we can notice that actual spreads have been fairly in line 
with the predicted spreads by the simulation. The decline in the level of actual spreads below 
the predicted level of spreads during years 2001-03 is no greater than upswings over the 
predicted values in the pre 1995 period.  
 
Hence, we can find little support here as well that controlling for the relevant factors, moral 
hazard has resulted in reduced spread levels.  
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  3.3  Results and implications 
 
The increase in the number of financial crises in the last decades of the 20th century and later 
on into the new millennium spurred the attention to financial crises phenomenon and 
stimulated researchers to start looking for the reasons for such upswing. Some researchers 
came up with the following conclusion: moral hazard phenomenon when nurtured can lead to 
emergence of financial crises or distress situations, and this is recognizable in the actions by 
IMF with providing exceptional financing to emerging countries. 
 
Starting from 1995 Mexican crisis, world witnessed generous support from IMF and the US 
government in mitigating liquidity problem faced by the Mexican government. Before 
‘tequila’ crisis IMF had never extended credits to the countries that exceeded their quota in 
the organization. However, when crisis hit Mexico the US hurried to the help together with 
IMF, whose big share of total available capital is injected by the US. Considering Mexican 
economy to a certain degree interrelated with the United States economy, Clinton 
administration did not want to run the risk of inducing spreading effect of the crisis on the US 
economy. Therefore, to some extent pressured by the US, IMF decided to lend 17 billion US$, 
which exceeded quota of Mexico by 700 %, thus acting as a lender of last resort. Overall 
amount of loans and credits to Mexican government reached 52 billion US$.  
 
Our suggested framework for analyzing the effect of moral hazard in inducing financial crisis 
situations is following: it is possible to find the track of moral hazard existence by comparing 
pre-1995 indicators when apparently no moral hazard effect was present due to the fact that 
investors and debtors did not expect IMF to bail out countries in trouble. Therefore, if there 
should be any kind of moral hazard effect, it should be reflected on the decrease in interest 
rates on loans to emerging countries, the increase in the amount of funding, etc. 
 
In our analysis we used EMBI as a major tool that depicts lending pattern to emerging 
markets. Overall observation of EMBI yields in comparison with pre-1995 level showed no 
sign of reduction in the interest rate spreads to emerging countries after Mexican financial 
crisis. In some small time intervals during observed time period (1992-2006) EMBI yields fell 
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below average line of 1992-94 levels, however it was not significant when compared to 
upswings the rest of the time. 
 
Afterwards, we compared EMBI yield with four different factors (US 3 month and 10 year 
Treasury Bonds, Merrill Lynch high yield corporate spreads, and Moody's sovereign credit 
rating). In all cases we did not detect statistically significant effect on pushing up EMBI. 
 
Finally we looked into the simulation of EMBI by relying on the factors indicated above from 
1992-94 levels. Simulation of EMBI then was compared with actual EMBI index. 
Comparison results also gave no support to the idea that EMBI spreads were reduced as a 
result of moral hazard effect. 
 
As a result of our findings we came to the conclusion that IMF financing packages have not 
resulted in creating moral hazard effect, and there is little support that IMF financing led to 
increased probability of the next financial crises.       
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